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DIVORCE AND FEDERAL INCOME TAXES
ROBERT J. JOHNSON*
MANY ATTORNEYS who are involved in divorce work appear to be
so intent upon accomplishing their client's purpose of a speedy disso-
lution of the marriage bond that they are overlooking tax considera-
tions involving rather sizable amounts of taxes, which considera-
tions should constitute significant bargaining points in negotiations
concerning property and financial settlements. In this article the
writer hopes to acquaint the reader in a general way with the most
important of these tax problems which arise in connection with
divorce as well as the pertinent provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code. The intention is to cover this matter in a practical manner
without attempting to exhaust all phases of the subject. With this
objective in mind then, this article has been subdivided into several
sections, each dealing with one of the aspects of the subject of
divorce and federal income taxes.
TAx TREATMENT OF ALIMONY PAYMENTS
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1942 alimony payments made to a
former wife were not regarded as income to her, nor were they re-
garded as a deduction from income for the husband.1 The Revenue
Act of 1942,' however, added several provisions to the Internal
Revenue Code, designed to make alimony and separate maintenance
payments income to the wife and deductible by the husband, thus
giving the husband some relief from the burden of swiftly in-
creasing surtaxes.
Section 22(k) of the Internal Revenue Code was one of the
principal additions and is concerned with the matter of the inclu-
*Member of the Minnesota Bar.
1. Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151 (1917).
2. 56 Stat. 816 (1942)
3. H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1942-2 Cum. Bull. 372, 409.
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sion in income of alimony 4 and separate maintenance payments.
Section 23(u) of the Internal Revenue Code, another of the added
provisions, on the other hand is concerned with the matter of the
deduction for such payments when made.
Actually the payments with which these two sections of the Code
are concerned may be of two sorts. First, they may be direct pay-
meits by the husband to the wife,, or second, they may be payments
merely attributed to property transferred in trust or otherwise.
Now, if the payments are of the latter sort the husband is not en-
titled to any deduction on his tax return for them. He is merely not
required to include any part of such amounts in his gross income
for income tax purposes.6
Turning attention to the direct payment situation, then, it should
be noted that in order that the provisions of the Code respecting
alimony and separate maintenance payments shall be applicable
strict compliance with the requirements of the Code provisions is
essential. Section 22(k) of the Internal Revenue Code estab-
lishes some five conditions which must be met in order that the pay-
ments shall qualify thereunder.
(1) A wife must be divorced or legally separated from her hus-
band under a divorce decree or a decree of separate maintenance.
(2) The payments must be "periodic payments," though they
need not be made at regular intervals.
(3) The payments must be received subsequent to the decree of
divorce or separate maintenance.
(4) The payments must be under the authority of a decree of
divorce or separate maintenance or a written instrument incident to
the divorce or legal separation.
(5) The payments must be made in discharge of, or attributable
to property transferred in discharge of, an obligation of support
arising out of the marital or family relationship.
The first requirement of Section 22(k), then, is that before the
provision shall apply the parties must be divorced or legally sepa-
rated under a decree of divorce or legal separation.7 Accordingly, a
4. The statute does not use the term "alimony" but instead refers to
"periodic payments." This is for the purpose of making the provisions ap-
plicable equally in states which do not recognize a right to alimony. H. R. Rep.
No. 2333, supra note 3.
5. Whereas the Code provisions speak in terms of "wife" and "hus-
band," Int. Rev. Code § 3797(a) (17) makes the terms interchangeable.
6. Int. Rev. Code § 23(u).
7. Charles L. Brown, 7 T. C. 715 (1946) ; Harold S. Smith, P-H 1947
TC Mem. Dec. I[ 47,335 (1947). aff'd, 168 F. 2d 446 (2d Cir. 1948). An
annulment decree does not satisfy this requirement. Bureau of Internal
Revenue Special Ruling, December 8, 1944.
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voluntary separation is insufficient.6 It has also been held that pay-
ments made by a husband to his wife under a court order for sup-
port and maintenance are not deductible for the husband if the court
order is not decree of legal separation but only a support order.,
Similarly, a court order or decree to enforce a provision of an agree-
ment of separation would not qualify in that there must be a decree
of divorce or legal separation and the obligation to pay must arise
under the decree or under a written instrument incident to the
decree."0
The second requirement of Section 22(k) as has been noted is
that the payments must be so-called "periodic payments." Thus, a
distinction is made by this provision between such payments and
those which are merely "installment payments of a principal sum."
This distinction is pointed up by an exception contained in Section
22(k) which provides in part as follows:
"an installment payment shall be considered a periodic payment
for the purposes of this subsection if such principal sum, by the
terms of the decree or instrument, may be or is to be paid within
a period ending more than 10 years from date of such decree or
instrument, but only to the extent that such installment payment
for the taxable year of the wife (or if more than one such install-
ment payment is received during such taxable year, then the
aggregate of such installment payments) does not exceed 10 per
centum of such principal sum."
These so-called installment payments of a principal sum, then,
are not considered as income to the wife unless they fall within the
exception noted above. A lump sum settlement made at the time of
the divorce consequently is not income to the wife, nor is it de-
ductible by the husband." It also follows that a lump sum payment
to the wife to permit her to purchase a home, or to pay her attorney's
fees are not periodic payments so as to qualify under the statute.
1 2
Nor would a lump sum payment to the wife to permit the purchase
of an annuity, or the transfer of a sum in trust for the wife come
within the meaning of "periodic payments." Moreover, it has been
8. Joseph C. Brightbill, P-H 1949 TC Mem. Dec. 1" 49,021 (1949),
aff'd per curiam, 178 F. 2d 404 (3d Cir. 1949).9. Frank J. Kalchthaler, 7 T. C. 625 (1946) ; Isidore Goodman, P-H
1949 TC Mem. Dec. ff 49,138 (1949) ; Angelo Frascone, P-H 1949 TC Mem.
Dec. 1 49,095 (1949).
10. George D. Wick, 7 T. C. 723 (1946), aff'd, 161 F. 2d 732 (3d Cir.
1947) ; Terrell v. CIR, 179 F. 2d 838 (7th Cir. 1950) ; it has been held that
the requirement of a court decree does not offend public policy by encouraging
legal separations. Max D Melville, P-H 1949 TC Mem. Dec. ff 49,255 (1949).
11. Joseph D. Fox, 14 T. C. 1131 (1950) ; Ralph Norton, 16 T. C. 1216
(1951), aff'd, 192 2d 960 (8th Cir. 1951) ; Arthur B. Baer, 16 T. C. 1418
(1951).
12. Arthur B. Baer, 16 T. C. 1418 (1951).
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held that such lump sum payments made pursuant to a decree or
terms of a written instrument do not become periodic payments
merely because other payments which are required under the decree
or instrument so qualify."" In other words, the provisions for pay-
ments in any decree or written instrument are severable. 14
It should also be observed that certain payments which would
have the appearance of possibly qualifying as periodic payments are
nevertheless held to constitute installment payments of a principal
sum. Thus, the payment of a fixed sum per week or per month for
a fixed period of time is held to be an installment payment of a prin-
cipal sum.15 Where a taxpayer, for instance, was required to pay
$100 per month until a total of $9,500 was paid, or until his wife
remarried, whichever first occurred, the court held this constituted
installment payments of a principal sum.' 6 Thus, even the con-
tingency as to remarriage was held not to make the sum uncertain.
On the other hand, if the amount of the payments although for a
fixed period is indefinite by reason of being made dependent upon
the amount of the husband's income, it has been held the payments
are not then installment payments of a principal sum, but are instead
periodic payments.'
7
Just as certain payments which appear to be so-called periodic
payments are not such, so also certain lump sum payments which
appear not to be periodic payments actually qualify as such. The
lump sum payment of arrears of alimony, for instance, has been
held to be a periodic payment for the purposes of Section 22(k).18
Similarly, where a divorce decree was modified retroactively so as
to increase the amount of alimony and to provide for payment of
such increased sum for past periods in a lump sum, the court held
such a payment was a periodic payment.' It would follow that a
13. Lemuel Alexander Carmichael, 14 T. C. 1356 (1950).
14. Ralph Norton, 16 T. C. 1216 (1951); William M. Haag, 17 T. C.
55 (1951) (holding that certain payments in addition to periodic alimony pay-
ments are not periodic payments) ; Edward Bartsch, 18 T. C. 65 (1952)
Jean Cattier, 17 T. C. 1461 (1951).
15. Frank R. Casey, 12 T. C. 224 (1949); W. B. Brandt, P-H 1950
TC Mem. Dec. ff 50,309 (1950).
16. J. B. Steinel, 10 T. C. 409 (1948) ; Frank P. Orsatti Estate, 12 T. C.
188 (1949). The Steinel case is discussed and criticized in Kuhn, Periodic
Alimony Payments, 28 Taxes 439 (1950).
17. Roland Keith Young, 10 T. C. 724 (1948) ; John H. Lee, 10 T. C.
834 (1948), acquiesced in 1948-2 Cum. Bull. 3. But cf. James M. Fidler, T. C.
Memo. Op., Dkt. 27910, C. C. H. Dec. 19,312(M) (1952) (holding that in-
stallment payments existed where amount of payment could be reduced if
husband's income was reduced by not having radio contract).
18. Estate of Sarah L. Narischkine, 14 T. C. 1128 (1950), aff'd, per
curiam, 189 F. 2d 257 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Jane C. Grant, 18 T. C. No. 127 (Sep.
16, 1952).
19. Elsie B. Gale, 13 T. C. 661 (1940), aff'd, 191 F. 2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951).
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mere lump sum settlement of an obligation extending into the future
which would be periodic payments when made should equally
qualify as a period payment.
If a husband agrees to, or is required to guarantee a certain in-
come as from a trust or property transfered, such amounts as he in
fact pays under the guarantee may qualify as periodic payments.20
It has also been held, however, that the term periodic payments in-
cludes only cash payments. Thus, a divorced husband could not
deduct the fair rental value of a residence which the former wife
was permitted to occupy.2 1
Finally, with respect to the requirements of Section 22(k) as to
periodic payments it should be observed that installment payments
of a principal sum which are to be deemed "periodic" must extend
over a period of more than ten years. It has been held this period
begins to run with the date the decree is signed.2 2 While it is not
absolutely clear when the period commences in the case of a written
instrument incident to a decree of divorce or legal separation, it
would appear that it should commence with the date on which the
agreement is executed.2 3
A third requirement of Section 22(k) is that the payments
must be received subsequent to the decree of divorce or legal
separation. Thus, payments made prior to the decree of divorce
have been held not deductible.24 Temporary alimony accordingly is
not deductible.2 5 In another case it was held that neither alimony
pendente lite, nor attorney's fees and court costs as allowed were
deductible. 26 Also the retroactive ratification of prior payments
by a divorce decree will not make the prior payments deductible for
the husband or taxable to the wife.2 7
With respect to the fourth requirement of Section 22(k) that
the payments must be made under the authority of a decree of divorce
or legal separation, or of a written instrument incident to the divorce
or legal separation, many cases have arisen. The cases largely have
20. Mahana v. U. S., 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl. 1950), cert. denied, 339
U. S. 978 (1951).
21. Pappenheimer v. Allen, 164 F. 2d 428 (5th Cir. 1947).
22. Harry Blum v. CIR, 177 F. 2d 670 (7th Cir. 1949) ; Tillie Blum v.
CIR, 187 F. 2d 177 (7th Cir. 1951).
23. Harry Blum v. CIR, supra note 22.
24. Loring M. Black, P-H 1951 TC Mem. Dec. ff 51,069 (1951) ; Daine
v. CIR, 168 F. 2d 449 (2d Cir. 1948).
25. Wick v. CIR, 161 F. 2d 732 (3d Cir. 1947).
26. Robert A. McKinney, 16 T. C. 916 (1951).
27. Robert L. Daine, 9 T. C. 47 (1947), aff'd, 168 F. 2d 449 (2d Cir.
1948).
28. Robert Wood Johnson, 10 T. C. 647 (1947) ; George T. Brady, 10
T. C. 1192 (1948) ; Bertram G. Zilmer, 16 T. C. 365 (1951).
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dealt with the question of when a written instrument may be said
to be incident to the decree. For this reason whenever it is possible
to do so the provisions of payments embodied in any settlement agree-
ment should also be incorporated into the decree itself. It seems quite
clear from the decisions that the instrument to be incident does not
have to refer to the divorce or legal separation, however. 28 Nor does
the decree have to refer to the written instrument to make it
incident thereto.29 The Tax Court interpreted the phrase "incident
to" to mean in effect that the parties must have contemplated divorce
or legal separation when the agreement was made. 30 The Circuit
Courts generally appear to be unwilling to take such a restricted
view. 1 In fact, in three recent instances, three different Circuit
Courts have reversed the determinations of the Tax Court and have
in effect held it is enough if divorce or legal separation was a
possibility at the time of the agreement and the agreement accord-
ingly made provision for the survival of its terms in the event of a
divorce or legal separation.3 - This phrase has also been construed
to include only agreements made prior to or contemporaneous with
the divorce decree."3 Payments made to a former wife in excess of
that fixed in an effective decree therefor are not deductible by the
husband. 34 An agreement to pay alimony made eighteen years after
a divorce in which the parties stipulated the wife would get no
alimony is similarly not an agreement incident to the divorce. 35 An
oral agreement is, of course, not enough to satisfy the requirement
of the Code. 36 However, it has been held that informal correspond-
ence between a husband and wife may constitute a "written instru-
ment" within the purview of Section 22(k). 37
A final requirement of Section 22(k) is that the payments must
be in discharge of, or attributable to property transferred in dis-
29. Jessie L. Fry, 13 T. C. 658 (1949).
30. Joseph J. Lerner, 15 T. C. 379 (1950) ; George J. Feinberg, 16 T. C.
1485 (1951).
31. Estate of'Daniel G. Reid, 193 F. 2d 625 (2d Cir. 1952).
32. Lerner v. CIR, 195 F. 2d 296 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Feinberg v. CIR, 198
F. 2d 260 (3d Cir. 1952) ; CIR v. MIiller, 199 F. 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1952).
33. Cox v. CIR, 176 F. 2d 226 (3d Cir. 1949), 98 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 435(1950; Newton v. Pedrick, fl 72,453 P-H Fed. 1953 (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 12,
1953). But ci. CIR v. Murray, 174 F. 2d 816 (2d Cir. 1949), 34 Minn. L. Rev.
280 (1950) (also noting Thomas E. Hogg, 13 T. C. 361 (1949) ; Rowena S.
Barnum, 19 T. C. No. 55 (Dec. 10, 1952).
34. Peter Van Vlaanderen, 10 T. C. 706 (1948), aff'd, 175 F. 2d 389
(3d Cir. 1949).
35. Emanuel Alboum, P-H 1951 TC Mem. Dec. ff 51,088 (1951); but
cf. Dorothy Briggs Smith, 16 T. C. 639 (1951), aff'd, 192 F. 2d 841 (1st Cir.
1951).
36. Ben Meyerson, 10 T. C. 729 (1948).
37. Charles Campbell, 15 T. C. 355 (1950) ; Floyd NV. Jefferson, 13 T. C.
1092 (1949).
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charge of, a legal obligation for support arising out of the marital or
family relationship. Thus, as has already been noted,3" there must
be more than merely a duty voluntarily assumed by the former
husband. The duty must actually be imposed by a decree or written
instrument. Also the payments must be for support and "in the
nature of alimony" or "in lieu of alimony." '39 The payments may
meet this requirement even though the particular state's law does
not impose a duty for support after divorce. 40 The Regulations of
the Treasury 4' make it clear, however, that Section 22(k) will not
apply to that part of any periodic payment attributable to something
other than the obligation of support, as for instance the repayment of
a loan, settlement of property rights or the like. Further it has been
held that the character of monthly payments designated in a divorce
decree as "an additional property settlement" is not changed by an
amended judgment entered nunc pro tunc four years after the
divorce and designating the payments as "alimony. '42
A review of the foregoing considerations and decisions with re-
spect to alimony or separate maintenance payments makes it clear
that care must be used in divorce negotiations and especially in
drafting instruments and decrees lest unintended tax consequences
result.
TAx TREATMENT OF SUPPORT PAYMENTS
Under Section22(k) of the Internal Revenue Code it is provided
that a wife will not be taxed upon any part of periodic payments
which are paid for the support of minor children. However, this
section of the Code limits such support payments to amounts
"which the terms of the decree or written instrument fix" for the
support of minor children. Thus, the decree or instrument must fix
the amount of support or the entire payment will be held to be in-
come to the wife.4 3 Where the amount of payment for the support
of minor children can be identified in the provisions of the decree
or written instrument it is not income to the wife, however.44 While
38. Peter Van Vlaaderen, supra note 34.
39. Thomas E. Hogg, 13 T. C. 361 (1949) ; but see R. Lehman, 17 T. C.
652 (1951) Nonacq. (holding that amounts paid to wife's mother under agree-
ment incident to divorce were deductible).
40. Tuckie G. Heese, 7 T. C. 700 (1946); Thomas E. Hogg, supra
note 39.
41. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, Sec. 29.22(R)-i.
42. Donald B. Semple, P-H 1952 TC Mem. f 51,263 (1951) ; also where
where agreement settles both property and support rights an allocation must
be made. Floyd H. Brown, 16 T. C. 623 (1951).
43. Dora H. Moitoret, 7 T. C. 640 (1946) ; Richard P. Prickett, 18 T. C.
No. 109 (Aug. 15, 1952); Elsa B. Chapin, P-H 1947 TC Mem. Dec.
1f 47,224 (1947).
44. Robert W. Budd, 7 T. C. 413 (1946), aff'd, 177 F. 2d 198 (6th Cir.
1947); Warren Leslie, Jr., 10 T. C. 807 (1948) ; Harold M. Fleming, 14
T. C. 1308 (1950).
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state law45 may raise a presumption that a single sum fixed and
designated as alimony and support will be presumed to be entirely for
support of minor children, it would appear that the contrary result
will nevertheless govern for Federal income tax purposes. 4 It has
been held that where an agreement provided for a single sum for
alimony and support for a child to be reduced to a lesser sum if
the wife remarried or received more than a certain amount of in-
come, the lesser sum was fixed for the support of the child.47 A nunc
pro tunc order modifying a divorce decree so as to designate pay-
ments for support of children has been held not to relieve the wife
from liability for tax on payments received prior to the order.4s
Section 22(k) also provides that where any periodic payment is
less than the amount specified in the decree or written instrument
then the amount paid will be regarded as the support payment to the
extent of such support payments rather than as alimony.
It should, of course, be observed that the requisite designation of
the amount paid for support of minor children will also affect the
question of the dependency exemption for such minor children.49 Of
course, the mere fact that a husband makes support payments which
are fixed by the decree or written instrument will not entitle him to
claim such minor children as his dependents. He still must be pre-
pared to show among other things that the amount so paid con-
stituted more than one-half of the actual support of the dependent
for the year in question.50
TAX TREATMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE PREMIUMS AND PROCEEDS
It is a rather common practice for a divorce court to provide
for an assignment of an insurance policy to the wife with the further
requirement that the husband keep the policy in force and pay the
premiums thereon. The Bureau of Internal Revenue has taken the
position that where premiums are paid by the husband on a life
insurance policy irrevocably assigned to the former wife naming her
as the irrevocable beneficiary the premiums are income taxable to
the wife and deductible by the husband. Where the policy is not
irrevocably assigned to the wife and where she is only the contingent
beneficiary the premiums would be neither income to the wife nor
45. Such as Minnesota, Minn. Laws 1951, c. 551, § 2.
46. Dora H. Moitoret, supra note 43.
47. Jason R. Swallen, P-H 1951 TC Mem. Dec. ff 51,149 (1951).
48. Edna M. Gilbertson, P-H 1951 TC Mem. Dec. 11 51,192 (1951).
49. Int. Rev. Code § 25 (b).
60. Int. Rev. Code § 25 (b) (3).
50. Int. Rev. Code § 25(b) (3).
51. I. T. 4001, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 27.
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deductible by the husband.12 This distinction finds support in
several court decisions, some of which unfortunately are more con-
fusing than clarifying. It has been held, however, that where the
policies are clearly irrevocably assigned to the wife and she is the
named beneficiary the premiums are includible in her income5 3
Similarly, in another case where a wife agreed to take as alimony
a certain percentage of her husband's income and further agreed
that premiums on insurance policies carried for her benefit were to
be paid out of this percentage and subtracted therefrom, the
premiums were taxable income to the wife when paid. 4 A wholly
different situation exists, of course, if the policy is merely assigned
to the wife as security for the continued performance of the husband's
alimony obligation after his death. Thus, where policies were de-
posited in escrow to secure the payment of a portion of the alimony
allowance given the wife the premiums were not allowed as de-
ductions.55 Similarly, the court has held that insurance premiums
were not taxable to a wife where the agreement was viewed as re-
quiring the premium payments merely as security for the continued
performance of the husband's alimony obligation after his death.5 6
Also, of course, if the policy is assigned to the wife with the chil-
dren as irrevocable beneficiaries and the wife as merely the con-
tingent beneficiary it seems clear that the premiums could not be
taxed to the wife.
Another problem which arises involving insurance policies as-
signed in connection with divorce involves the tax consequences of
the assignment on the proceeds of the policies. Generally proceeds
of a life insurance contract paid by reason of the death of the in-
sured are exempt from Federal income taxes.5 7 An exception arises
where there has been an assignment of the insurance policy for a
valuable consideration.55 It would seem that where there is an assign-
ment of a life insurance policy irrevocably to the wife in a divorce
proceeding there would be an assignment for a valuable considera-
tion thus making the proceeds paid on death of the insured subject
to possible income taxes. The release of her marital right to support
by the wife would, surely seem to constitute a valuable considera-
52. Ibid.; for a complete discussion of insurance matters relating to
divorce see Price, Insurance Aspects of Divorce and Separation Settlements,
9th annual Inst. on Fed. Taxation 435 (N. Y. U. 1951).
53. Anita Quinby Stewart, 9 T. C. 195 (1947).
54. Estate of Boies C. Hart, 11 T. C. 16 (1948).
55. Lemuel Alexander Carmichael, 14 T. C. 1356 (1950).
56. Blumenthal v. CIR, 183 F. 2d 15 (3d Cir. 1950); F. Ellsworth
Baker, 17 T. C. 1610 (1951).
57. Int. Rev. Code § 22(b) (1).
58. Int. Rev. Code § 22(b) (2).
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tion. This same result would seem to follow where the proceeds of a
policy which has been given merely as security are transferred in
discharge of the obligation for further support.59 Because of this
consequence of assignment in divorce actions there may be some
situations where the issuance of a new insurance policy directly
to the wife rather than the assignment of an existing policy would
be preferable. This would depend, of course, on whether the hus-
band is insurable, the cost and other factors. If a new policy was
issued to the wife, however, there should be no problem as to the
exempt status of the proceeds.
TAx TREATMENT OF ALIMONY TRUSTS AND ANNUITIES
It will be remembered that it was pointed out early in this article
that certain indirect payments are also within the scope of Sec-
tion 22(k) of the Internal Revenue Code. That section provides
that periodic payments received by the wife which are "attributable
to property transferred (in trust or otherwise)" are taxable in-
come to the wife. It also expressly provides that such amounts as are
thus received are not to be included in the gross income of the
husband, ° but also it is to be noted that he gets no deduction for
such payments. 61 Thus, these provisions remove any danger of the
application of the doctrine of the Clifford case6 2 to alimony trusts.
The husband, of course, gets no deduction for the principal trans-
ferred in trust, either. In substance he is merely relieved of the bur-
den of income taxes on the income of the property transferred. If the
periodic payments under the trust are more than the income at-
tributable to the property transferred potential deductions for pay-
ments of principal are lost. Moreover, the entire amount of the
payments received by the wife whether out of income or principal
are taxable to the wife as income.63 These same principles apply
equally whether the payments are attributable to property trans-
ferred in trust, to life insurance, endowment policies, annuities or
any other interest in property.6 4
Reflection on these considerations makes it quite apparent that
there are no unusual tax advantages as such to alimony trusts, and
that in fact there may be some tax disadvantages. The advantages,
if any, arise because of the greater flexibility afforded by the ali-
59. Such as the arrangement involved in Blumenthal v. CIR, supra
note 56.
60. Int. Rev. Code, § 22(k).
61. Int. Rev. Code § 23(u).
62. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
63. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, Sec. 29.22(K) -1 (b) ; Girard Trust Corn Ex-
change Bank v. CIR, 194 F. 2d 708 (3d Cir. 1952).
64. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 2922(k)-l(b).
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mony trust as compared with the lump sum settlement, for instance,
while still affording to the wife the security which comes from an
immediate transfer of property by the husband. Thus, a husband
can readily impose certain restrictions, limitations, or reversions
upon the property transfer to be effective on such contingencies as
the wife's remarriage, or death which could not be done generally in
a lump sum settlement involving an outright property transfer.
Notice should also be taken of the fact that Section 22(k) of the
Code applies only to transfers in trust which are made in discharge
of a legal obligation for support imposed by a court decree of
divorce or legal separation or a written instrument incident there-
to." Section 171 of the Internal Revenue Code, also added by the
Revenue Act of 1942, deals on the other hand with certain other
periodic payments received by a wife from an estate or trust after a
divorce or legal separation. It provides that such periodic payments
as the wife receives after the divorce or legal separation and which
would otherwise be includible in the gross income of the husband
shall be included as income of the wife.66 It must be emphasized,
however, that this section will not apply to any case to which Section
22(k) is applicable.6 Moreover, there are important differences
between the two sections. Thus, Section 22(k) applies to a trust
created before a divorce but not in contemplation of it.68 Also, it
applies to a trust under which the husband was beneficiary if he
assigns his interest therein to his wife so that she becomes entitled
to receive the payments. Finally, whereas Section 22(k) requires
the wife to include the full amount of her periodic payments in gross
income, Section 171 merely requires that the wife include in gross
income so much of the payments as are paid out of the income of
the trust. As under Section 22(k), under Section 171 trusts the
husband gets no deduction for payments thus indirectly made to the
wife."" He merely escapes thereby the tax on the trust income
which otherwise would be regarded as taxable to him.70 Trust in-
come designated for the support of minor children under the terms
of the decree or trust agreement is expressly excepted from the
operation of Section 171 (a) making this section's treatment con-
sistent with that afforded by Section 22(k) to such amounts.7,
65. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.171-1(a). For a discussion of alimony
Trusts see Dean, The Alimony Trust 28 Taxes 911 (1950).
66. Int. Rev. Code § 171(a).
67. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.171-1 (a) ; Girard Trust Corn Exchange
Bank v. CIR, supra note 63.
68. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.171-(a).
69. Int. Rev. Code § 23(u).
70. Int. Rev. Code §§ 166-167.
71. Int. Rev. Code § 171-1 (a).
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Section 171 of the Internal Revenue Code has also been relied
upon by the courts in a somewhat different connection. It has been
held that an estate may take a deduction for alimony payments paid
out of income of the estate to the decedent's wife under a property
settlement agreement whereby the husband or his estate was re-
quired to pay the wife a fixed monthly amount during her natural
life.7 2 The court held in that situation that the wife is a beneficiary
under Section 171 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code.-3 Similarly, it
has been held that such amounts are includible in gross income of
the wife.
74
THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY WITH AN APPRECIATED VALUE
Perhaps one of the least noted dangers involved in marital settle-
ments is the possibility of the realization of gain by the husband
through the transfer of assets which have appreciated in value. A
husband having a large investment portfolio might well be inclined
to accede to a wife's demand for a lump sum settlement to be
effected by the transfer of certain of his investments to her. How-
ever, if this is done it has been held that the husband will realize
gain on the property transferred to the extent that the market value
exceeds his basis.75 Thus, where a taxpayer delivered to the wife
as lump sum alimony and for support of child securities which had
greatly appreciated in value over their cost, the court held this
disposition of securities in discharge of the husband's obligation of
support to the wife and child enabled him to realize the enhance-
ment in value and the gain was accordingly includible in gross
income.7 16 While these decisions pre-dated the alimony provisions
of the Code they are not in any sense affected by the changes. More
recent decisions have confirmed their principles by holding that the
basis of the wife receiving property under marriage settlement
agreements is the value at the time of the transfer to the wife.77
This obviously means that the transfers are viewed as taxable ex-
changes rather than transfers by way of gift so that the husband
incurs a taxable gain, if any, on the transfer. While market value
of the property transferred is the most likely method of valuing the
72. Estate of Homer Laughlin v. CIR, 167 F. 2d 828 (9th Cir. 1948) ;
B. C. M. 25999, 1949-1 Cum. Bull. 116.
73. Estate of Homer Laughlin v. CIR, 167 F. 2d 828 (9th Cir. 1948) ;
B. C. M. 25999, 1949-1 Cum. Bull. 116.
74. Helen Scott Fairbanks, 15 T. C. 62 (1950).
75. CIR v. Mesta, 123 F. 2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941).
76. CIR v. Halliwell, 131 F. 2d 643 (2d Cir. 1942).
77. Farid-Es-Sultanah v. CIR, 160 F. 2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Aleda N.
Hall, 9 T. C. 53 (1947), acquiesced in 1947-2 Cum. Bull. 2; Christiana de
Bourbon Patino, 13 T. C. 816, 826 (1949), aff'd, 186 F. 2d 962 (4th Cir.
1950).
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consideration received by the husband it will be noted that other pos-
sibilities suggest themselves, such as determining the wife's potential
support and dower rights based upon mortality tables. Two interest-
ing decisions"8 have taken the position that where the wife accepts the
property at a set valuation in dollars that is her basis regardless of
whether the market value was actually higher or lower on the date
of transfer.
The lack of decided cases on the matter of realization of gain by
husbands suggests that the Bureau of Internal Revenue has not
thus far pursued the possibilities for finding taxable income in such
settlement transfers. One probable reason is that taxpayers are not
apt to report transfers of property occurring in connection with
divorces in their tax returns, and consequently the matter has not
been focused for scrutiny by auditing revenue agents.
TAX TREATMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN DIVORCE MATTERS
As evidence of the avowed purpose of approaching the subject
of this article in a practical manner, what could be more practical
than the matter of deductibility of attorney's fees? Unfortunately,
the courts have been far from friendly in allowing tax benefit from
attorney's fees incurred in connection with divorce and related
matters. Thus, it has been held that expenses incurred by the hus-
band in contesting an action to compel payment of alimony are not
deductible.7 1 Such expense, then, is not viewed as coming within
the scope of non-business expense incurred in the management,
conservation or maintenance of property held for the production of
income covered by Section 23 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Instead it is viewed as personal living expense which is expressly
not deductible under Section 2 4(a) of the Code.80 The Bureau
has also ruled that attorney's fees which a husband is obligated to
pay and which are paid to the wife's attorney for his efforts in
obtaining an increase in alimony do not qualify for the alimony
deduction under Section 23(u) of the Code. 81 However, the courts
have allowed a deduction to the wife for attorney's fees she in-
curred in obtaining a financial settlement incident to a divorce, 2
78. Aleda N. Hall, supra note 77; Christiana de Bourbon Patino, supra
note 77.
79. Thorne Donnelley, 16 T. C. 1196 (1951); Lindsay C. Howard, 16
T. C. 157 (1951), aff'd, 202 F. 2d 281 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 1953).
80. Lindsay C. Howard, supra note 79. An analogous result as to at-
torney's fees incurred in contesting gift tax liability is found in Lykes v.
U. S., 343 U. S. 118 (1952).
81. I. T. 3856, 1947-1 Cum. Bull. 23.




and for those incurred in obtaining an increase in alimony pay-
ments. 3 The second circuit, however, left this matter undecided
in disposing of a case on appeal involving this question S4 A most
interesting decision is the recent case of Baer v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue s5 in which the court allowed the husband a de-
duction for a portion of his attorney's fees which were allocable to
arranging the husband's financial affairs in connection with a
financial settlement occurring in connection with a divorce. This
case may offer some hope for tax benefit in situations where the
divorce settlement involves the stock of a closely held corporation or
other income producing property.
CONCLUSION
In a very general way this article has attempted to review the
major income tax aspects", of divorce and related matters. It
should be emphasized that there are very important gift tax and
estate tax considerations which may also affect the question of trans-
fers in connection with marital settlements and obligations for sup-
port arising thereunder.-- A consideration of these matters, how-
ever, is beyond the scope of this article. It is hoped that this article
nevertheless has served to impress upon the reader the need for tax
planning in connction with marital settlements.
83. Elsie B. Gale, 13 T. C. 661 (1949), aff'd, 191 F. 2d 79 (2d Cir.
1951).
84. Elsie B. Gale, supra note 83.
85. 196 F. 2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952).
86. Treatment has merely been given to Federal Income Tax Provisions.
States may afford independent peculiar treatment under their income tax law.
Minnesota, for instance, follows very closely the Federal pattern. 1 Minn.
Stat § 290.72 (1949). The most significant departure has been that Minnesota
has permitted an alimony deduction only for alimony paid to a Minnesota
resident. 1 Minn. Stat. § 290.072(2) (1949). Thus, if the former wife left the
state the benefit of the deduction was lost. This has been remedied by Chap.
667 Laws of Minn. 1953 which allows the deduction regardless of whether
alimony is paid to a Minnesota resident or not.
87. The Bureau position is stated in E. T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 166
and holds a transfer for release of dower rights isn't adequate and full con-
sideration whereas a transfer in satisfaction of the obligation of support is
such. A further development of this matter occurred in the controversial de-
cision of Harris v. CIR, 340 U. S. 106 (1951). For a complete discussion of
matters affecting the gift tax see, Smith, Gift Tax in Relation to Limip-Sim
Divorce Settlements, 10th Annual Inst. on Fed. Taxation 107 (N. Y. II.
1952) ; Note, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 918 (1952).
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